Warfare and military history Archives

Cover of Intelligence in War

Intelligence in War
John Keegan
443 pages including index
published in 2003

John Keegan is one of the better known British military historians, having been a lecturer at Sandhurst before becoming defence editor at the Daily Telegraph, as well as writing a slew of books about military history. Keegan seems to write two kinds of books: the first kind follows a war or campaign in some detail, while the second takes a specific aspect of war (or even war as whole) and follows its development through the ages. Intelligence in War is an example of the second kind. As you may guess, he’s somewhat of an establishment historian, accepting and understanding that war is an essential part of human nature, even if an unfortunate part. He’s therefore more interested in writing how wars are fought than how they come to be. Within those limitations he’s an excellent history writer, one of my favourites when it comes to military history.

Intelligence in War, as said, is typical of Keegan’s work. Through the careful selection of several case histories Keegan examines the role intelligence plays in warfare and its limitations and capabilities to influence battles. Keegan distinguishes five separate stages intelligence has to go through to be able to influence a battle: acquisition, delivery, acceptance, interpretation and implementation. Due to difficulties that can arise at each stage, Keegan is skeptical about how influential intelligence is for a given battle. His main thesis is that intelligence can be useful in battle, but is rarely decisive, even in those cases which are supposed to be the examples of intelligence determining the outcome of battles. For Keegan, intelligence is only ever a secondary factor in winning or losing battles, with things like the relative balance of forces and the determination and will of the opposing troops and commanders being much more important.

Cover of Russia's Air Power in Crisis

Russia’s Air Power in Crisis
Benjamin S. Lambeth
233 pages including index
published in 1999

The end of the Cold War was strange, because it wasn’t the nuclear holocaust we all imagined it was going to be, the final confrontation between the free west and the communist east. Instead it ended with a whimper, not a bang, as the Soviet empire collapses from the inside. With it crumbled the Russian army, which went from being an unstoppable menace to a laughing stock in the space of less than a year. Budgets were slashed, careful gathered stockpiles of weapons were destroyed or sold, units were brought back from Eastern Europe and when the USSR itself split, suddenly not just the army was split over a dozen different countries, but also its supporting infrastructure of weapon plants, repair depots and design bureaus…

The various new Russian army branches therefore had to meet formidable challenges in the post-Soviet era, perhaps none more so than its airforces. It’s this that’s the subject of Russia’s Air Power in Crisis, which looks at these problems through a somewhat American lens. This is most visible in the constant references the author makes to the role American airpower played during the First Gulf War and the impression this made on the Russians. More subtly, it’s also visible in the assumption of how airpower should be used, in that a proper airforce should be like the USAF and adhere to its philosophy. It speaks for Lambeth that he recognises this tendency in himself, when he discusses what might have been the outcome if the balloon had gone up and the Soviet and NATO airforces had met each other in the skies above Western Europe.

Articles with the Tag Warfare and military history

Intelligence in War – John Keegan

Russia’s Air Power in Crisis