He Can’t Say He Wasn’t Warned
There is so much I could say about this, principally in the area of who’s to blame for this fuckup for the ages, but I’m convalescing from the flu and trying to avoid conniption fits. So I’ll just leave the text to speak for itself.
I guarantee that by the end of it, steam will be coming out of your ears.
A memo to Tony Blair from his own personal envoy to Iraq 3 years ago, from the Guardian:
‘An unbelievable mess’:
Memo from John Sawer, Blair’s special envoy to Iraq after Saddam’s overthrowTuesday March 14, 2006
The Guardian
Confidential
Personal from special rep for Iraq
For:
No 10: Powell, Manning, Campbell, Rycroft
FCO: PS/SOS, PS/O’Brien, PUS, Ricketts, E m, Chaplin, Chilcott
Subject: Personal: Iraq: What’s Going Wrong?
1. A Baghdad First strategy is needed. The problems are worst in the capital, and it is the one place we can’t afford to get it wrong. But the troops here are tired and are not providing the security framework needed. We need a clear policy on which Ba’athists can return, a more concerted effort on reconstruction, and an imaginative approach on the media. For all this, money needs to be released by Washington. The clock is ticking.
Detail
2. Four days in Iraq has been enough to identify the main reasons why the reconstruction of Iraq is so slow. The Coalition are widely welcomed, but are gradually losing public support.
3. Garner’s outfit, ORHA, is an unbelievable mess. No leadership, no strategy, no coordination, no structure, and inaccessible to ordinary Iraqis. Bremer’s arrival is not a day too soon. Garner and his top team of 60-year old retired generals are well-meaning, but out of their depth. Tim Cross is widely seen as the only senior figure offering direction …
4. It is clear that Baghdad is the biggest problem. Other parts of Iraq are getting organised: there are minimal Shia/Sunni tensions; town councils have been agreed in the sensitive cities of Mosul and Kirkuk; and so on. But Baghdad has the worst security, a poor level of essential services and no information flow …
Security
5. No progress is possible until security improves. Crime is widespread (not surprising as Saddam released all the criminals). Car-jackings are endemic. Last week the Ministry of Planning was re-kitted out ready to resume work; that night it was looted again. The evening air is full of gunfire. There is still a climate of fear on the streets and that is casting a shadow over all else.
6. A big part of the problem is the US Third Infantry Division. They fought a magnificent war and now just want to go home. Unlike more mobile US units they are sticking to their heavy vehicles and are not inclined to learn new techniques. Our Paras company at the embassy witnessed a US tank respond to (harmless) Kalashnikov fire into the air from a block of residential flats by firing three tank rounds into the building. Stories are numerous of US troops sitting on tanks parked in front of public buildings while looters go about their business behind them. Every civilian who approaches a US checkpoint is treated as a potential suicide bomber. Frankly, the 3rd Inf Div need to go home.
7. The military culture in the capital needs to change before their replacements (another heavy armour division) arrives. An operational UK presence in Baghdad is worth considering, despite the obvious political problem. Transferring one of our two brigades is presumably out of the question, but one battalion with a mandate to deploy into the streets could still make an impact. CGS saw the problem last Friday and can offer more professional advice.
8. Re-forming the Baghdad police … needs to be accelerated. The police need to start patrolling with sympathetic soldiers, rather than with one police car sandwiched between four Humvees. Weapons, uniforms, funds, vehicles, access to fuel and a functioning judicial process are all problems.
De-Ba’athification
9. The other fear among ordinary people in Baghdad is that the Ba’athists could still come back. ORHA have made mistakes, appointing quite senior party figures in the trade and health ministries, at Baghdad University and so on. Several political leaders I have seen say a line should be drawn at the “firqa” level of the Ba’ath party and all those at that level and the three above should be excluded, about 30,000 in all. Whatever, we need to set out a clear policy.
Reconstruction
10. With security and credible de-Ba’athification will come the chance for durable reconstruction. Power is back, though is not robust. Water is running but is not potable. 40% of Baghdad’s sewage is pouring into the Tigris untreated. A GSM mobile phone system is desperately needed as communications are dire. Bechtel who have the main contract are moving far too slowly.
11. Quick results projects are also needed to show there is progress. We need visibly successful projects, however small: schools and hospitals reopening, new bakeries, food distribution points. That is not a substitute for long term development, but it would meet genuine needs.
Information
12. Baghdad has no TV, and no newspapers apart from party political rags. I was given two fliers yesterday, one calling for the assassination of all Ba’athists, the other for the killing of all US forces. That, and rumour, are the only information flowing. An ORHA TV project is due but its content will be tightly controlled and it risks not being credible. I have pressed them, as a start, to broadcast a Premier League game each day, but the Americans don’t yet get it.
13. More progress is being made with radio: the BBC (English and Arabic) should be up on FM this week. But, as all political leaders have stressed, Baghdad needs independent newspapers, radio stations and terrestrial TV stations. One idea is to give satellite dishes and screens to cafes so that people can have access to pan-Arab channels – but it needs funding.
14. OFU-iA also needs a public face. Bremer’s people already have this in mind, as ORHA’s bunker image is painfully apparent.
Funds and public sector salaries
15. Finally, money needs to be available, not least to pay police officers and public service workers. This is held up in Washington. The US administration are refusing to release Iraqi money to pay salaries. Decisions are needed on salary levels and which currency should be used.
15. There are hundreds of small problems needing attention. But the big five areas set out above, and security, is both the most important and most sensitive. There will be an instinct in Washington to allow Bremer time to find his feet. That will take another week or more – and the clock is ticking. I will talk to him, but will have to feel my way at first.
Footnotes
Jonathan Powell Downing Street chief of staff
Sir David Manning No 10 foreign policy adviser
Alastair Campbell head of press
Matthew Rycroft Tony Blair’s private secretary on foreign affairs
ORHA Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, the first US civilian adminstration in Iraq
Jay Garner retired US general who headed ORHA until replaced by US diplomat Paul Bremer
Major-General Tim Cross Garner’s British deputy
CGS British chief of the general staff, at that stage Sir Michael Walker
Firqa Rank in the Ba’ath party just below regional command
Tags: Iraq War Tony Blair
