Did you really expect anything different from Ignatieff?

Derrick O’Keefe on the failed intervention of Michael Ignatieff in Canadian politics:

In January 2005, three insiders from Canada’s Liberal Party came calling on Ignatieff at Harvard. Writing in The Walrus, Ron Graham described the meeting. The kingmakers from Ottawa outlined a scenario whereby Ignatieff would return to Canada after three decades abroad, win the party leadership and in short order become prime minister of Canada. The Liberals were the country’s “natural governing party,” after all. It’s not known whether there was mention of sweets and flowers. Ignatieff accepted the invitation.

In the end, however, his visions of conquest proved almost as delusional in Canada as they did in Iraq.

It depends on how you view his mission. As I understand it the Liberals were a centrist, left leaning party before Ignatieff got his mitts on them, while he always has been a rightwing courtier to power. So if you needed somebody to not wage opposition against Harper’s conservatives, destroy the liberals as a party and hand Harper a majority in parliament, he was the man to do it, and he did. Just like with Iraq, where all the meaningless guff about being greeted with flowers had always clearly been nonsense, the idea that Ignatieff could do anything else was idiotic. Assuming the people who wanted him as leader weren’t idiots, they may have gotten just what they wanted — and bugger the liberal voter.

Your Happening World (20)

The perfect Daily Express cover.

Labour is facing a deep crisis that threatens its survival as a party of power, Ed Milibandwill be warned, on Wednesday as he is told to avoid the “politics of protest” and to focus on establishing political credibility.” Better not rock the boat Ed, or your masters might get upset. Play the game using the proper rules and don’t get so uncouth as to actually take it seriously.

The humilation of the Yes campaign: an analysis of why the AV Yes campaign failed, from a supporter: “From the outset, the YES campaign was all about the tiny coterie of people who feel strongly about electoral reform. The emphasis was on these people “having fun” and being invited to comedy evenings. In email after email from the YES campaign, the quirky behaviour of this “producer set” was celebrated and the “consumer set” ignored. So, some bunch of local activists who had written the letters Y, E and S in big letters on a beach were hailed as creative geniuses. Others were highlighted for running a particularly successful street stall. From the point of view of any observer, it was all about “them”(the micro-percentage of constitutional reform obsessives) never about “us” (the people). None of this self-indulgent madness won a single vote for the YES side, but it probably lost thousands.” OUCH!

One example of why any political activist should stay away from Facebook. It has been very good at conning people into thinking Facebook is just like the Internet, but you’re at the mercy of an unsympathetic commercial entity that’d rather you’d Farmvilled. Real activists get their own servers.

Clearing out the weeks old tabs on my browser, here are two articles on the Bristol Stoke Croft riots from OpenDemocracy: an eyewitness account and an analysis of how the police and media spun it.

Read all your links? Then have a kitten as a treat:



Yet Clegg does speak Dutch…

Daniel Davies analyses the LibDem’s failings:

This is, to a large extent, why the vote share has collapsed. The median LibDem voter between about 2002 and 2010 was quite likely someone who believed (sensibly, a respectable case could certainly be made for this) that they were to the Left of Labour. Their signature policy was a hypothecated income tax increase for education, along with did-they-or-didn’t-they opposition to the Iraq War. Now, their electoral support consists of electoral reform trainspotters, about a dozen people who read the Orange Book and daydream about being Gerhard Schroeder, plus that part of the West Country that doesn’t get regular newspapers and believes that it is still voting for Gladstone. They have lost precisely that set of voters who they have spent the last year more or less intentionally losing.

Had Clegg made use of his Dutch heritage other than flattering Dutch newsmedia by talking to them in their own language, he could’ve boned up on the example of D66, like the LibDems a centrist party in some aspects to the left of the (Dutch) Labour Party. in the Dutch system coalition governments are of course the standard rather than the exception and D66 has had long experience with the opportunities and perils they offer.

D66 always has troubles in government because while usually the centre of a coalition, it’s also the smallest party, caught between two bigger ones with more opportunities to let their own voice be heard. So you’d have the CDA or VVD on the right fighting their corner, the PvdA on the left doing the same and D66 being crushed in the middle. As a rule of thumb, government participation leads to losing the next election. D66 knows this and therefore is careful to get something back for it; when they don’t and let the desire to be in government overrule their principles, they get punished even harder for it. Luckily for them the Dutch voter is more forgiving than the British and they have usually been able to quickly rebuild their following once back in opposition. Even so the party has been careful in getting concrete results in return for their support.

Something the LibDems forgot. If the best you can do is to get a referendum on a voting system you don’t actually want yourself, you haven’t really bargained all that well. Had I been Nick Clegg my two set in stone demands would’ve been getting the ministery of finance and getting a vote in parliament for proportional representation. It was the Tories who needed the LibDems, not the other way around. Instead Clegg traded everything for a chance to feel important and is now paying the price. Had he paid attention to Holland, he would’ve known better.