Antifascists are the real terrorists!

With local elections to be held early next month, the AIVD, the Dutch security and intelligence service warns about an insidious new threat in the runup to these elections: the threat of antifascist demonstrations (Dutch). In a letter sent to all mayors in the Netherlands, the AIVD describes the sinister group responsible for this threat: AFA, Anti Fascistisch Actie and its methods. It makes for chilling reason the way this group is in the habit of contacting local governments to advice them on racism, organises counterdemonstrations against nazi intimidation and even organises within local communities to defend against racist aggression! Worse, they even deliberately cause the racists and fascists they organise against to attack them and beat them up.

Ironically, the AIVD even accuses AFA from infiltrating rightwing groups in order to gather intelligence on them — something the intelligence services have never done themselves, at least succesfully.

This piece of fearmongering, silly at it is, does show the mindset of those supposedly guarding us. Rightwing, racist and even fascist intimidation is not a problem, but attempts to defend against it are beyond the pale. This is of course neither new nor surprising, considering the rightwing sympathies of most intelligence services. As long as rightwing violence doesn’t threaten the state directly it’s tolerated, even encouraged, while leftwing activism is always a threat, no matter how legitimite or innocent, even in supposedly democratic states. What is new is how blatant this warning was, something we have not seen in a while. A more paranoid person might wonder about possible connections between this, the economic situation and the way this is used as an excuse for the drastic budget cuts the government wants to force through parliament…

Official: Balkenende is a war criminal

He won’t appear before the International Criminal Court (conveniently located in Den Haag not too far from parliament) anytime soon, but the conclusions from the Dutch Iraq inquiry (PDF, in English) do show that the Dutch political support for the war was neither as easily decoupled from the actual war as the then government made it out to be nor justified by international law. Finally it has been officially confirmed what we all knew or at least suspected back then, that the existing UN resolutions on Iraq were never sufficient legal justification for the war. Not that anything will come from it, but at least we saw our beloved prime minister embarassed and humiliated.

I’m still reading the report as a whole, but the conclusions reached by the inquiry don’t contain any real surprises. That the war was illegal as well as immoral I knew anyway, that the decision to support the war was reached long before it was discussed in parliament, for entirely different reasons than officially stated, wasn’t news either. It was clear from the start that the CDA-led government was led by its traditional policy of “Atlantic solidarity”, a desire to engage with the US and be seen as a dependable ally of it, a lesser form of the British delusions of a special relationship. The war was never assessed on its merits, the possible outcomes were not taken into account.

Though the material support of the Netherlands for the war was small, the political effect of its support was to lend a veneer of respectability to what was essentially an unilateral US war. The distinction between “political but no military support” was completely unclear and largely elided outside the Dutch political debate, presented by the US as if it meant we had given our full support. Again, not a surprise.

Some common themes emerge from the inquiry’s conclusions, which are also coming to light in the British Chilcott inquiry. There’s the dodginess of the legal reasoning for the war, as well as the exagerration of the available evidence for WMDs — turns out the Dutch intelligence services were much more skeptical about this than the government told us at the time, shock horror. More important is the utter disdain for the democratic process shown by both governments. In the Dutch case, the inquiry concludes that the decision was rammed through parliament and went entirely against the wishes of a majority of the voters.

However I’m still convinced that the massive protests against the war in the Netherlands helped convince the government from active participation in the war, against their own instincs, as they realised they could not overcome the combination of active voter hostility and parliamentary resistance to this, including from their own MPs, at a time when the domestic political situation was far from stable. This is not directly supported by the inquiry’s conclusions, but reading between the lines the formula of “political support, but no military support” looks like a typical Dutch compromise position taken by an internally divided government unwilling to turn this disagreement into an open conflict. Interestingly during part of the runup to the war the government coalition included the LPF, the party of Pim Fortuyn, which was largely against the war, not something you’d expect considering its background…

(All of the above analysis is a bit late in the day I admit, but I’ve been busy…)

Was a Dutch MEP starting a coup in Nicaragua?

That’s the accusation Nicaraguan president Ortega has made against Hans van Baalen, a member of the European Parliament for the VVD, the Dutch liberal party. According to Ortega, van Baalen had talked to senior officers to gauge their willingness to overthrow the Sandinistian government. Van Baalen of course denies this. This accusations comes after van Baalen had already been asked to leave the country, an action for which the Nicaraguan government later apologised and of which van Baalen was again ignorant, as he had already left the country anyway…

How much of all this is true is difficult to say. To be honest I can’t really see van Baalen, even if he’s a rightwing blowhard, as a coupist. What would be in it for him to get himself involved in this way?

Dutch airline pilot was junta murderer

Julio Ponch

Last Tuesday a Dutch airline pilot, a naturalised Argentinian, was arrested in Spain, just when he was stepping aboard his plane for his last flight back to the Netherlands before retirement, with his wife and son present for it. The reason for this heavyhanded arrest? He’s been charged with having been involved with the death flights carried out by the junta that ruled Argentinia between 1976 and 1983. Julio Poch supposedly was stationed at the infamous ESMA, the Navy Petty-Officers School of Mechanics, which was turned into a prison and torture centre, from which hundreds. if not thousands of prisoners were taken into flights over the open ocean, then dropped out of the plane. Allegedly Poch had been bragging about this to some of his co-workers once the Argentinian junta was back in the news again due to the marriage of crown prince Willem Alexander to Maxima Zorreguita, daughter of one of the ministers involved with the junta…

That was back in 2000, so why it took nine years for this guy to be arrested is a question the Dutch justice ministry needs to answer. The Netherlands doesn’t have an extradition treaty with Argentina, unlike Spain, which is the reason he was arrested there, but the Dutch authorities could’ve at the very least informed their Argentine colleagues about Poch. It’s a bit of a trend, I’m afraid. The Netherlands is very lax when it comes to dealing with known war criminals and such like, despite its rhetoric. It just isn’t a priority for either the government or the police.

But the arrest of Julio Ponch, though decades after his suspected crimes, is still good news for those wanting some justice for the victims of America’s War on Terror. Thirty years from now, will we see arrests of pilots of extraordinary rendition flights?

Wilders chickens out of local elections?

So next year there will be local council elections in the Netherlands. These are usually a good guidance to how well a party will do in general elections, how well the current government is doing as well as which of the opposition parties will profit from any weaknesses. In 2002 for example we had local elections just before the general elections (as the then governing coalition had splintered) and the huge surge his party had in cities like Rotterdam made apparant then that Pim Fortuyn would win big in the national contest as well. In the end of course other forces intervened and Fortuyn never got to witness those elections…

In this context, what to make than of Geert Wilders’ decision to stand for election in only two cities, Den Haag and Almere, but nowhere else, not even Rotterdam where Fortuyn’s succesors have been able to keep their seats on the council through all the upheavals which killed off the national party. Is this an admission of weakness, control freakery or something else?

As Wilders himself had admitted, one reason for limiting his ambitions in this election is the example of Fortuyn. After he was murdered, his party was taken over by chancers and egomaniacs, got into government but completely disintegrated in less than three months, taking the government with them. The LPF neither had the history nor the structure to keep going once Fortuyn himself was gone and even if he had not been murdered it’s doubtful whether it could’ve kept itself together; it was just slapped together too quickly to be stable.

Wilders has learned from this. He has structured his party — like Fortuyn also did — to keep himself in total control at all times by making it into an assocation without members, but with
contributors without voting rights. This in itself is not enough of course, but because Wilders has had the opportunity to let his party grow slower and hence could afford to be careful in chosing his candidates it has worked so far. There have been some mishaps with his MEPs, but nothing to embarassing and he has kept a short leash on his MPs in the Dutch parliament. If his party, the PVV (Party of Liberty), goes allout in the local elections they stand a good chance to win big in certain parts of the country, but at the expense of control. It’s just no possible to control an election campaign involving hundreds or thousands of candidates and volunteers in dozens of cities, unless you have a party structure that’s controlled by more than just one man’s will. (What’s more, you actually have to worry about local issues rather than the Moroccan Menace and that just won’t do…)

Insteads he plays it smart. He has chosen two typical Wilders cities to stand in. There’s
Den Haag with its old neglected inner city working class neighbourhoods with the same sort of muted ethnical and racial tensions you see in similar neighbourhoods in Burnley. Then there’s Almere, which you could see as a sort of “white flight” suburb of Amsterdam, where a lot of affluent and semi-affluent middleclass families move to out of Amsterdam once they get children. In the first city you have the, if you may, traditional Wilders and Fortuyn supporter: poor, working class or lumpen and xenophobic, especially against Moroccans and Muslims, long ignored by the traditional parties but not as much as they complain about. In the second city you have the “new” Wilders supporter: middleclass, not as openly xenophobic but worried about the influence “those people” have on the supposedly tolerant Dutch culture.

A big win for Wilders in either city, let alone both, will be a huge blow to all other parties, but especially the old, established triumvate of Christian Democrat (CDA), Liberal (VVD) and Social-Democrat (PvdA) parties. It will be seen as yet more evidence that these parties still cannot reach the socalled Fortuyn voters despite all their attempts in the last five years to appeal to them. If they win in Almere it will be even worse, as that will be proof that the party can now reach beyond their traditional base and appeal to the core voter, the nice middleclass people who do their civic duty in every election and who used to vote CDA or VVD or PvdA but who do see a lot of sense in what Wilders is saying.

So concentrating on those two cities makes a lot of sense for Wilders. It will be interesting to see how the other parties react. They need to resist the temptation to make this into a national referendum on Wilders and focus on the issues any normal local election revolves around, but they can’t make the mistake of ignoring him either. A lot depends on the candidates Wilders will select.