History

The Wages of Destruction – Adam Tooze

Published on January 9, 2011

Cover of The Wages of Destruction

The Wages of Destruction
Adam Tooze
800 pages including notes and index
published in 2006

When I read Hitler’s Empire back in August, I had actually wanted to read The Wages of Destruction, due to Alex Harrowell’s review when it came out. I couldn’t find it so Mark Mazower’s book was a more than acceptable substitute. Both books look at the economy of Nazi Germany and the empire it carved out, each in their own way. Whereas Mazower’s point of view is that of a historian turned economist, Tooze approached the subject from the other side: economicst first, historian second. And while Mazower primarily looked at the interaction and tensions between nazi ideology, economci reality and the demands of war, Tooze goes for the more fundamental question of how the fundamental constrains of the German economy influenced nazi decision making, argueing that seemingly irrational decisions made by Hitler and the nazi leadership, not the least the decision to invade Russia, made perfect sense when looking at the economic context.

Which is not to say, nor does Tooze, that Nazi ideology wasn’t not irrational or evil, but that if you take into account their worldview, that in this context their decisions were rational and clearheaded and clearly informed by the economic realities of Germany. To the Nazis, as to most intelligent observers between the wars, it was clear that Germany was doomed to be a second rate power, not big or rich enough to seriously challenge countries like England, with its vast colonial empire, let alone America or the USSR. Under the Weimar Republic, the best it could hope to achieve was to become a middling European power, growing rich on American coat tails. Nazism set out to change this, to conquer a larger living space for the German race by force and through pure willpower and technology transform the German economy into the equal or even the superior of the American. This struggle lies behind all strategic decisions the Nazi leadership made in the runup to the war and during it, each time putting their faith into another great leap forward, each time still finding themselves in the same box, in the end not having been able to overcome these fundamental limitations.

Emperor of the West – Hywel Williams

Published on January 1, 2011

Cover of Emperor of the West

Emperor of the West
Hywel Williams
460 pages including notes and index
published in 2010

Emperor of the West: Charlemagne and the Carolingian Empire is a book I ran across when looking for other books in the Middelburg library, but which turned out to be exactly the book I needed to read after having spent most of December reading Peter Heather’s empires and Barbarians. Heather’s book was a comparative history of the first millennium CE, from the Late Roman Empire through to the Carolingian and Ottonian empires, of which the Carolingian was the first European empire with had its power base in north-west Europe, as opposed to the Mediterranean basin. Heather’s focus was on the interactions of these three empires with the various “barbarian invasions” each had to deal with and how these shaped what would become modern Europe, but what it made me want to read was more about the Carolingians themselves, which is where Emperor of the West came in handy.

Though not quite an introductionary level book — some familiarity with the various characters is expected — Emperor of the West turned out to be a good overview of Carolingian history. Williams’ main focus is on Charlemagne himself, but through him looks at wider Carolingian culture and history. He consistently puts Charlemagne in the context of the Western European recovery from the fall of the Roman Empire in which the awareness of imperial Rome and its history helped shape Charlemagne’s empire, in the same way that the Carolingian conviction that they were uniquely blessed by Christ also did. The Carolingians always looked back to the Roman past and consciously set out to restore it in their own image, but in the process created something new, the first European empire not to depend for its power on the Mediterranean Basin.

Rome’s Gothic Wars – Michael Kulikowski

Published on January 1, 2011

Cover of Rome's Gothic Wars

Rome’s Gothic Wars
Michael Kulikowski
225 pages including notes and index
published in 2007

Rome’s Gothic Wars, written by new to me American historian Michael Kulikowski is meant as an entry level introduction to the Goths and their conflicts with the Roman Empire. As such it’s quite short, with the main text being only 184 pages long. As a history it only deals with the Goths as they first entered Roman consciousness, in the late third century CE, up until the sack of Rome by Alaric and his Goths in 410 CE. Kulikowski does deal with the Gothic “prehistory” in passing, but does not deal at all with their later history and evolution into separate Visogothic and Ostrogothic kingdoms. For Kulikowski, those first two centuries of Roman-Gothic interactions form a neatly completed story, one that turned “Goths” into the Goths.

As Kulikowski argues, wondering where the Goths came from before they are first mentioned in Roman histories is pointless, nor should too much attention be paid to the “deeply misleading” Getica of Jordanes, the sole Roman source for the supposed origins and migration of the Goths, as other modern historians still do, attempting to separate the wheat from the chaff. Instead, Kulikowski believes that the Goths were a product of the Roman Frontier, like the Franks and Alamanni, who appear at the same time. Roman military, economic and cultural interactions with the barbaric tribes along their frontiers created new political entities and the Goths were one of them. The Gothic origins lie in the exact same parts of the Roman frontier zones that they first appear in Roman history, north of the Danube and west of the Black Sea and he’s quite harsh on any modern historian who thinks otherwise.

The Ruin of the Roman Empire – James J. O’Donnell

Published on November 28, 20101 Comment

Cover of The Ruin of the Roman Empire

The Ruin of the Roman Empire
James J. O’Donnell
436 pages including index and notes
published in 2008

A few years ago I became interested in Roman history, especially with the later Roman Empire, what historians now call Late Antiquity, the period during which Rome supposedly fell. Supposedly fell, as the simple history we’ve been taught in school of barbarian invasions from the fringes of the Empire finally overrunning its heartlands, looting Rome and deposing the last true Roman Emperor in 476 CE, is of course wrong. That story is an invention, largely created by, as James J. O’Donnell put it, “a short, fat man”, Edward Gibbon, in his famous Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, which codified this standard history of the fall of the Roman Empire. It was challenged in the early seventies, most famously by Peter Brown’s The World of Late Antiquity, as new research and new generations of historians started to question this old story. They found a Roman Empire and world that was severely challenged in the fifth century CE, but much more continuity between the old classical world and the new dark ages than there had been room for in the standard model.

Fast forward a few decades and the revisionists themselves are being corrected by later generations of scholars, e.g. in the books of Peter Heather and Bryan Ward-Perkins I’ve reviewed before. James O’Donnell’s entry on the subject, The Ruin of the Roman Empire is the most idiosyncratic so far I’ve read, aptly summed up by its subtitle: “The emperor who brought it down. The Barbarians who could’ve saved it.” The emperor is Justinian I, who wanted to make the empire whole again, the barbarians the supposed invaders who had taken over its western provinces. O’Donnell argues that if Justinian I had not tried to reconquer Italy and North Africa, but had concentrated his energies on his Eastern provinces and the border with Persia, something like the Roman Empire could’ve survived for longer than it did, if not an united Roman Empire. The fall of Rome in 476 CE was not the end of the Roman Empire.

Hitler’s Empire – Mark Mazower

Published on October 3, 2010

Hitler's Empire

Hitler’s Empire: How the nazis Ruled Europe
Mark Mazower
726 pages including index and notes
published in 2008

“Germany could have racial purity or imperial domination, but it could not have both.”

That’s the fundamental paradox that Mark Mazower uncovers in Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe. On the one hand, there is the Nazi’s obsession with making Germany a pure Aryan state, expelling or murdering the lesser races within its borders. On the other, their equally compelling obsession to rule Europe, or at least “reunite” all those parts of Greater Germany outside the German borders. But with the Anschluss of Austria, the annexation of the Sudetenland, the further invasion of what was left of Czechoslovakia, not to mention the invasion of Poland, it brought not just many more Germans, but also millions of Poles, Czechs, Jews and others under Nazi control. The question was, what to do with them and the somewhat accidental empire Nazi Germany had acquired.

A question that became even harder after Germany had defeated the western allies and ruled France, Norway and the Low Countries, had subjugated Yugoslavia and Greece to come to the aid of Italy, then had invaded Russia and at a stroke added immense new territories to its empire, populated with millions upon millions of those the Reich saw as racial enemies. Nazi ideology wanted a pure state, wanted to get rid of the Jews and the Poles and all those others living in those conquered territories. At the same time the economic realities, not to mention the demands of war meant that at least in the short term these “undesirables” could not be removed. If Nazi Germany wanted to rule an efficient empire and defeat its enemies in the East and West, it could not do so without the support, coerced or not, of those “inferior” people it rather wanted to get rid off.