Russia’s Air Power in Crisis

Cover of Russia's Air Power in Crisis


Russia’s Air Power in Crisis
Benjamin S. Lambeth
233 pages including index
published in 1999

The end of the Cold War was strange, because it wasn’t the nuclear holocaust we all imagined it was going to be, the final confrontation between the free west and the communist east. Instead it ended with a whimper, not a bang, as the Soviet empire collapses from the inside. With it crumbled the Russian army, which went from being an unstoppable menace to a laughing stock in the space of less than a year. Budgets were slashed, careful gathered stockpiles of weapons were destroyed or sold, units were brought back from Eastern Europe and when the USSR itself split, suddenly not just hte army was split over a dozen different countries, but also its supporting infrastructure of weapon plants, repair depots and design bureaus…

The various new Russian army branches therefore had to meet formidable challenges in the post-Soviet era, perhaps none more so than its airforces. It’s this that’s the subject of Russia’s Air Power in Crisis, which looks at these problems through a somewhat American lens. This is most visible in the constant references the author makes to the role American airpower played during the First Gulf War and the impression this made on the Russians. More subtly, it’s also visible in the assumption of how airpower should be used, in that a proper airforce should be like the USAF and adhere to its philosophy. It speaks for Lambeth that he recognises this tendency in himself, when he discusses what might have been the outcome if the balloon had gone up and the Soviet and NATO airforces had met each other in the skies above Western Europe.

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Silly solutions for serious problems

via Unfogged, comes this absolutely fucked-up “solution” for the Israel-Palestine conflict only an economist could love:

Bueno de Mesquita’s answer to this dilemma, which he discussed with the former Israeli prime minister and recently elected Labor leader Ehud Barak, is a formula that guarantees mutual incentives to cooperate. “In a peaceful world, what do the Palestinians anticipate will be their main source of economic viability? Tourism. This is what their own documents say. And, of course, the Israelis make a lot of money from tourism, and that revenue is very easy to track. As a starting point requiring no trust, no mutual cooperation, I would suggest that all tourist revenue be [divided by] a fixed formula based on the current population of the region, which is roughly 40 percent Palestinian, 60 percent Israeli. The money would go automatically to each side. Now, when there is violence, tourists don’t come. So the tourist revenue is automatically responsive to the level of violence on either side for both sides. You have an accounting firm that both sides agree to, you let the U.N. do it, whatever. It’s completely self-enforcing, it requires no cooperation except the initial agreement by the Israelis that they are going to turn this part of the revenue over, on a fixed formula based on population, to some international agency, and that’s that.”

Even if you can take the underlying and unarticulated assumptions of this solution seriously, there’s plenty of criticism to be leveled at this, but the fundamental flaw lies deeper. Mesquita’s solution ignores the realities of the conflict for the politically correct view of it, which is that both parties are equally at fault locked into a conflict neither wants, which mutual distrust keeps going and if only there was some magical formula that could break through the distrust, the conflict could be solved.

Reality is different. The current situation is not the result of two parties desperately wanting peace but afraid to trust each other, but has been deliberately engineered by one of them, Israel. Israel has acceptated that an outright annexation of the occupied territories and/or direct ruling its Palestinian population is now impossible, due in large part to the first Intifada. Instead, why not let a nominally independent Palestinian government do your job for you, while making it impossible for the Palestinian strategies during the First Intifada to work again?

Israel’s post-Oslo strategy therefore has been to force the Palestinians to accept the semblance of an independent state in the territory conquered in 1967, while keeping a firm control of everything of interest within it. So the Westbank has been carved up in a patchwork of Palestinian bantustans, each surrounded by Israeli settler colonies and Israeli only roads, with the Israelis controlling the borders with Israel and Jordan. Which means that each of these statelets can be cut off at will if need be, while the media can be kept outside. Meanwhile the Palestinian Authority only has nominal control over its territority, as it doesn’t control its own airspace, water supplies or even much of its income (with the Israelis e.g. controlling customs and excise). The only real authority the Palestinian government has is the authority to police the population for Israel.

This strategy has made a repeat of the First Intifada, with its emphasis on relatively non-violent direct resistance, impossible, as we’ve seen with the Seconf Intifada, when the suicide bombers took over. If you’re cynical enough, you might say that the emergence of the suicide bomber targeting “soft” civilian targets as the major vector of Palestinian resistance against Israeli rule was an intended side effect of the Israelí strategy, as it kept support at home for repression high, while it got sympathy abroad. Even more so of course for the Palestinian rocket attacks, which are much less lethal than suicide bombings but almost equally dramatic.

The problem therefore is not that both sides are desparately looking for peace but don’t know how, but that one side has already won the conflict, but only in a way that keeps it eternally frozen. So no, silly solutions as “revenue sharing on tourism” will not help here.

The heart of the matter

In an excellent article by Henry Porter on the Guardian’s Comment is Free blog about Gordon Brown’s generous offer to give the British a bill of rights, the following paragraph succintly explains where a large part of New Labour’s authoritarianism is coming from:

In a new paper, Roger Smith, the director of Justice, puts his finger on an important part of the government’s culture. ‘A single thread links together matters as apparently diverse as the Iraq war, Asbos and the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill. That thread is an impatience by ministers with due process, either in the legislative process of policy or its execution.’

Which is odd, since so many of New Labour’s top bods are supposed to be lawyers, so they should be familiar with the concept of due process and its importance.

My current obession

Musically speaking.

Yes, I know. But it’s just so perfectly eighties naff and I’m not ashamed for liking this. Better this than Tokio Hotel.

Wikipedia’s hacking me off again

The problem with Wikipedia is it’s high visibility. It’s always had a lot of attention online as well as in the media, but in the past two years the hype kicked into overdrive, until the point that everybody in reach of CNN now knows two things about it: it’s an encyclopedia and everybody edit it. On the whole this is a good thing, as that means more people come over and help, but it also draws in the numbnuts unfortunately. And there are so many of them: conspiracy theorists, xenophonic nationalists of every possible variety, fratboys and other jokers, those who think Wikipedia is just one big game for their entertainment, just complete idiots, undsoweiter. It doesn’t make it easier.

Case in point: the article on James Nicoll, which over the course of this weekend has been under attack from a more persistent than usual nutter, some anonymous prick from an Earthlink segment. What they have been doing is abusing Wikipedia policy for a subtle campaign of sabotage, in the process turning what was not that good an article anyway into a complete and utter shitheap, keeping several editors, including yours truly, working all weekend to try and undo the damage, only for the little fucker to do more.

There are ways to get around this: semi-protecting the page by disallowing anonymous edits, banning the user in question (though since they use dynamic IP addresses this is hard to do without bothering others at his isp), etc, but you shouldn’t have to do this. Due to its open nature and high visibility Wikipedia is very vulnerable to trolling, and while damage is usually quickly repaired, it’s the battles with the trolls that wear people out. It was much more fun three years ago, when you could still edit pages without having to engage in pest control.